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According to Aristotle, art (technë) imitates nature. This
celebrated doctrine is not limited to what we cal 1 the /fine artsf, 
or to works of fartf in any narrow modern sense; and it does not 
mean that such art-works copy things in the natural order. It 
means, more generally, that craftsmen adopt means to produce ends; 
and that in doing so, they follow a pattern found throughout 
organic nature. The crafts, in their respective domains, do what 
nature does everywhere. This parallel often provides Aristotle with 
analogies from the crafts to illuminate the workings of nature.
,The Poetics is uniquely interesting in that it shows his mind
moving, as it were, in the opposite direction. To illuminate a
particular craft, that of the poet, he sometimes uses analogies
from organic nature. In this paper I explore these analogies for
the light they throw upon his conception of the poetTs work, and
especially upon his defence of epic and drama against the assaults 
2
of Plato.
Aristotle’s use of zoological models is not, of course, new. 
Organic thinking pervades Greek philosophy from its earliest
3
stages, and is especially common in Plato. But in Aristotle it 
assumes a distinctive form. He repeatedly draws ideas from his own 
arsenal of biological concepts and applies them in characteristic 
fashion to a variety of phi 1osophica1 issues. Today, when the 
biological framework of his thinking has been widely appreciated 
in other areas, I hope that its bearing upon his literary theory 
will repay a fresh look.
2By 'zoological' models I shall mean comparisons of poetic
works not only with animals but also with likenesses of animals.
zôion can mean ’picture’ as well as ’animal ’ ; and zôgraphia for
painting embodies a connection between that art and its living
subjects that is absent from our words ’painting’. ’picture’, or 
4’portrait'. Just as a picture commonly depicted a live subject, so 
Aristotle could naturally think of the subject-matter represented 
by poetry as analogous to a living thing. He could also think of 
the different types of poetic product as akin to living species, 
and as needing to be methodically classified, if they were to be 
scientifically understood.
This is apparent in the very first sentence of the Poetics 
(47a8-13), where Aristotle approaches poetry, as Northrop Frye has 
said,
as a biologist would approach a system of organisms, picking 
out -its genera and species, formulating the broad laws of 
literary experience, and in short writing as though he 
believed that there is a totally intelligible structure of 
knowledge attainable about poetry which is not poetry itself 
or the experience of it, but poetics.
But here the title Poetics (literally. ’On poetic [craft]’), like
our own word ’poetry’, is liable to mislead us. These words derive
from poiesis which meant, quite generally, ’making’. Plato had
noticed [Symposium 205d~e) the peculiar narrowing of usage that
restricted this word to the making of metrical verses. Carpenters
and blacksmiths are not ’poets ’ in this sense ; even t hough they are
as ’poetic' in the original broad sense as any wordsmiJth. But in
Aristotle’s hands the word poiesis, especially as used in
conjunction with mimesis, undergoes a further shift, in which,
although still limited to verbal ’making’, it is sharply
dissociated from the use of metre.
This shift is of fundamental importance. If metre is made a 
defining property of 'poetry', then Plato's Phaedrus or the Book 
of Revelation, for all the beauty of their language, would no more 
count as 'poetry' than the novels of Agatha Christie or the 
Canadian Constitution; whereas most of Hamlet and all of Paradise 
Lost would qualify as 'poetry', but so equally would the crudest 
limerick on a washroom wall: In combating this view of poiêsis,
Aristotle makes a momentous point. He says that Empedocles, though 
he used the same metre as Homer, should be called a 'natural
philosopher' (phusiologos) rather than a 'poet'(47b17-20). And the 
works of Herodotus would not cease to be 'history of a sort' 
(historia tis) even if they were put into metrical verse (51b2-4). 
Empedocles wrote an account of the physical world, and therefore 
was primarily what we should call a natural scientist. Herodotus, 
who recorded the struggle between the Creeks and Persians, was what 
we should call an historian. On the other hand, Aristotle notices 
(47b9-13), there is no single word for what Plato's dialogues have 
in common with the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus, realistic
sketches dramatizing the events of everyday life.
Aristotle is here remarking the lack of a word covering
representational making (47b15), whether in verse or in prose. What 
made Homer or Plato 'poetic'- in this sense was not the fact that 
they were making something in metre, but that they were ma ki nq 
something up. Plato was not constrained by facts about real-life 
conversât ions of the historic Socrates. Homer was not constrained 
by facts about the Trojan Wars as Herodotus was constrained by
4facts about the.Persian Wars. When Homer and Plato produced their 
works, they invented conversations and incidents. They used their 
imaginations. In a word, they composed fiction.
That is what the Poetics is primarily about. It deals with 
those verbal products in which we invent, feign, or make up things 
that claim no fidelity to fact- These products can be made well or 
badly, but they are so not by virtue of being true or false to 
historical or scientific fact, but by virtue of quite different 
criteria, which Aristotle makes it his main business to explore. 
Thus, what he says, though mostly stemming from two verse genres, 
epic and tragedy, has a far wider relevance. Much of it applies 
to plays, stories, novels, and fiction in general. And the central 
idea in his defence of poiêsis was that Plato had radically 
misrepresented the nature and purpose of fiction. In broad outline 
that response will be familiar enough, but I shall try to bring 
some of its detail into sharper focus.
Plato's charges against the representational poet may be 
briefly recalled from their famous formulation in Republi c X. 
First, the tragedian and all other representers are 'third from the 
king and the truth’ (59?e8-8): the poet has only a tenuous grasp 
of reality or truth. Second, the poet appeals to an inferior side 
of our nature, to emotions that should not be indulged but held 
firmly under control. The emotional release afforded by
representational poetry is injurious, because it weakens our 
ability to manage our emotions in the stresses of real life 
(Republic 604c~d).
5Two points in this attack receive special emphasis, both made 
through analogies between poetry and painting. First, the poet is 
reproached for using alluring language: just as painters rely.on
colour and shape, so poets rely upon metre and melody. The appeal 
of both is spurious, the former beguiling us with shapes and 
colours, the latter with words and music, into thinking that they 
know what they are talking about (601a-b).
Secondly, the painter represents things in the world of 
sensible particulars, ordinary beds and tables, and the carpenters 
that make them (598a~c). Likewise, the poet represents particular 
battles and the generals that fight them. Such objects or events 
are the stuff of ordinary human experience, not the metaphysical 
realities or universal truths that can be grasped, in abstraction 
from their particular instances, only by a philosopher. So poets 
have no genuine knowledge, but only the most superficial grasp of 
the realities they purport to depict.
Aristotle responds to both those points. The first, he thinks, 
mistakes what is peripheral for what is essential to poetry. 
Metrical or lyrical language merely ’garnishes' the poet’s work 
·. (49b28), but forms no essential part of it. To locate the pleasure 
of tragedy in its use of language is to miss what Aristotle calls 
its ’proper’ pieasure, i.e. that which derives from its distinctive 
function. Lyric poetry , though said, to be -the most important of 
garnishings' (50b16), is peripheral. The same goes for spectacle 
(opsis), which Aristotle says is 'emotionally powerful but is the
least integral of all to the poet’s art' (50b16-18).
/ .
6This last point is made several times, by emphasizing that 
tragic drama can achieve its impact even without theatrical 
performance or actors (53b1~7, cf. 50b18~20, 62a11-13, a17-18): it 
merely needs to be heard. Aristotle thinks of plays being read, as 
epics were recited, aloud. This confirms the view of poiésis taken 
above. For if it is essentially what we call 'fiction', then indeed 
its central appeal does not depend upon metrical or lyrical 
language, nor does it require theatrical performance. And for us, 
even if not for the ancients, the pleasure of fiction can be 
obtained from reading prose narrative or drama alone in silence.
The answer to Plato’s second point is contained in Aristotle’s 
famous contrast between ’poetry’ and history. This turns upon a 
distinction between
events which have occurred (ta genomena, 51a35~38, b4)
and
the kind of events which could occur, and are possible by the 
standards of probability or necessity. (51a38-38, b5).
The former are the domain of the historian, the latter of the
poet. Aristotle continues: .
It is for this reason that poetry is both more philosophical 
and more serious than, history, since poetry speaks more of 
universals, history of particulars. A ’universal’ comprises 
the kind of speech or action which belongs by probability or 
necessity to a certain kind of character. (51b5~9)
The distinctions drawn here are not, Aristotle proceed^ to argue
(51b29~32), invalidated by the fact that dramatists often use
actual events and real individuals for their subjects. Historic
facts may serve the poetic purpose as well as purely imaginary
ones. The depiction of ’the kind of events which could occur’ can
be achieved as well by the appropriate treatment of real events as
Iby inventing fictitious ones. Thus Plato’s, charge that the poet
represents mere particulars misses its target, even in those cases
where the events dramatized actually took place.
This passage, and a later one (59a17-29), which draws some
further contrasts between the poet and the historian, have often
8been criticized for their primitive view of history. Much of the
criticism is well-founded, and there is no point in trying to
defend Aristotle against all that may be urged against him. But he
can still be said to have put his finger on the fundamental
9difference between history and fiction. The historian's task is to 
discover and narrate the course of particular events. This task 
functions as an overriding constraint. It dictates, for example, 
that the temporal order of events not be altered; that significant 
events not be omitted from the narrative; that events which are not 
known to have happened, or are known not to have happened, not be 
invented; and that statements based upon firm evidence should be 
distinguished from speculation or gossip.
No such constraints limit the writer of fiction. Even in a 
play based on real events, fidelity to fact is not of primary 
importance, though we may prefer the historical record to be 
respected where it is known for certain. Where the facts are not 
known, story-tellers are free to invent, supplement, order events, 
introduce imaginary characters or. episodes, to suit their purposes. 
And in pure fiction, they are free to do whatever they please. They 
can use events and characters in their stories to exhibit whatever 
general truths about human behaviour they wish to il lústrate. The 
exhibition of such truths is, moreover/ the dynamo that powers
8their narrative. Here, they say, is a certain sort of person placed 
in a certain sort of situation, and this will show you the kind of 
thing that is done or experienced by such people when they are 
placed in such situations (51b8-10).
This is the sense in which poiêsis is 'more philosophical' 
history. Historians are not committed ex officio to exhibiting 
general truths about human life. Their central task as historians 
is simply to record events as they have grounds for believing them 
to have occcurred. They are not entitled to trim, adjust, distort 
or supplement them, in order to support a generalization or point 
a moral, or to make the story more interesting.^
Historians are limited, then, by the facts about Alcibiades, 
whatever those facts were. Their primary purpose is, to that 
extent, particular, not general. Since they are in no position to 
generalize until they have established the facts, universels cannot 
be their starting point. Story-telTers, by contrast, start from 
general truths to which they are independently committed, and aim 
to exhibit those truths to their audience or readers. That is why 
Aristotle says (51b9-10): 'this is what poiêsis aims at, assigning
names'. He means that it has a generalizing aim, despite assigning 
names to the characters, or perhaps that it assigns names at a 
later stage of composition.^ The fiction-writer has in mind, at 
least initially, not individuals but character-types, which the 
characters are chosen to exemplify. So indeed fiction-writers have 
often conceived of their task. It is what Aristotle saw as their 
task, and what he thought that Plato had disastrously ignored, when 
he damned the poet as 'third from the king and the truth'.
9So much for some highlights of Aristotle's response to Plato.
It will now be profitable to review some 'zoological' texts.
12In his analysis of the 'qualitative parts’ of tragedy (ch 6), 
Aristotle places enormous stress upon the factor of piot—structure 
(muthos), which he calls 'the first principle (arche) and. so to 
speak, the soul (psuchi) of tragedy’ (50a38-39). We should read the 
organic metaphor here in the light of Aristotle's mature philosophy 
of mind. The psuchi is the 'form* of the living body. It is the 
distinctive set of capacities in virtue of which an organism is a 
creature of whatever kind it is. Moreover, it is the attainment 
of those capacities in the adult member of any species that is the 
ultimate explanation for its physical structure, for the organs it 
develops, and for every stage in its growth. Hence, its 'soul' is 
the ultimate source of every feature that it possesses, which is 
why Aristotle here conjoins psuchi with arche.
This conception of the soul finds a clear analogue in tragic 
plot. The plot is what determines everything that happens in a 
play, including everything that the characters say and do. It 
shapes the entire action from start to finish, just as the 
capacities that a living animal must have, if it is to be whatever 
kind of creature it is, determine its physical make-up and direct 
each stage of its growth from conception to maturity.
The plot, then, determines the unfolding of thé action, much 
as the soul determines the course of an animal’s growth. It 
functions, in Aristotelian terms, as a * final cause', a goal in the 
dramatist’s design. Thus ’the events and the piot-structure' are 
called ’the goal’ (telos) of tragedy; and the goal is said to be
10
'what matters most of all' (50a22-23, cf. 50b22~23). telos here 
does not mean the terminus of the play's action, but is applied to 
the whole nexus of events in which the tragedy consists.
That nexus must, however, have an ending, a single final 
outcome, which the events dramatized conspire to bring about. And 
this outcome will necessarily affect the dramatist's structuring 
of the events that produce it. For they will be placed where they 
are, so that they may bring about whatever ending the plot 
dictates, e.g. the downfall of Oedipus through the discovery of his 
own guilt. The play must unfold so as to lead intelligibly to that 
final outcome. The earlier events must be presented so that they 
appear to necessitate, or at least render probable, the later ones. 
But in terms of plot construction, the shoe is on the other foot: 
it is the final outcome that may be said to necessitate the events 
that bring it about.
Thus, governing the composition of a play there is something 
analogous to what Aristotle elsewhere (Phys. 11.9, PA 639b24- 
64 0a1 1, 642a1-642b4) cal Is 'hypothetical necessity', which controls 
or directs-the development of an animal. If that is how things are: 
finally going to turn out, then this is what has to happen earlier 
to secure that result. A must happen, so that B may follow. C must 
say D so that E will believe F about G, and will therefore commit 
H,.. which will lead I to tell J that K has .said L. This will ensure 
that M does N to 0, in order that P may do Q to R. And thus S will 
ask T to say U to V, so that W may persuade X to get Y to kill Z!
In securing the final outcome there is a place in drama, as
■ 1 ■' ■ v l . v  Α Α Τ Τ γ γ Ι Υ  T Y. ■ Ύ ΥΥ·;’ ■.·,·' y lY Y - Y Y . '  I T  Τ·-Υ 'Υ :Υ f  ■·:' /  ■: '· '.· ; v  T v ' ' . a  ; v Y · : ' ! ; ;  T /V Y . τ . ; · ' . . · : Υ " Υ Υ . : ' , Υ Λ .,- Υ : : / Υ !.:·'Υ : γ,· Υ ·γ Y γ γ ΐ  · ΥγΥ ' y  . : ,.·Υ·. ' ΥΥ , . 'Υ ν  :■ Υ ;'·γ . .·
in organic growth, for the opérâtion of 1 ikelihood or necessity.
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for connect-tons that show the sorts of causal relations that 
experience would lead us to expect. The impression must be given 
that later events are the necessary or likely outcome of earlier 
ones, since a plot will be plausible (pithanon, 51bl6,■ 55a30 , cf. 
60a27-b1) only if it reflects an order of experience that is 
intelligible to us. But like animal development, dramatic structure 
is controlled essentially ’from the end’, and therefore it is the 
ending to which we must ultimately look, if we wish to understand 
the construction of a play.
In this way we may understand Aristotle’s stress upon the 
importance of familiar sorts of necessary or probable connection 
between the events of the play, even where the plot takes a 
surprising turn (52a1-11, cf. 52a18-21). What is contrary to our 
normal expectations, what does not form part of a coherent sequence 
of events, such as unlikely coincidence or the use of deus ex 
machina (54b1~2) , wi 11 seem art if iciall y contri v'ed demanded by the 
requirements of the plot, rather than a credible representation of 
human life and deliberately chosen action. To that extent the play 
will fail of its purpose, to enlighten its audience by exhibiting 
universal truths about human character and conduct.
In ch 7 Aristotle begins to lay down the principles of plot 
construction. He starts by resuming from 49b24-25 his earlier
formal definition of tragedy as ’a representation of an action 
which is complete (teleles), who!e (holes) and of a certain
magnitude* (50b23-25).
Teleios means ’mature*, ’fully developed*. The word suggests
■■ . ■·.·■ : . 'h .T  T:v . V  Λ  ■ .V,'.':· ;· Τ· ;-T:; T;·.: ./Τ' ■ ; . / T,:.,V ' ; y'  ; -.r T  T i y . f  - T  · ■ :·:■ ; T ; :/
that the action represented by the play must possess the wholeness
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of a full-grown animal. 'Whole', which may be meant to explicate 
teleios in this way, is itself explicated as 'possessing a 
beginning, middle and end', notions that are immediately defined 
in terms of necessary or likely causal relations within a 
temporally ordered series of events (50b27-31). The plot must 
embody these relations so that the events of the play will be 
connected in the way we have Just considered.
What exactly does Aristotle mean here by 'beginning, middle
and end'? Does he think of the piot—structure in terms of animal
morphology, comparing it with the beginning, middle parts and
extremities of an animal’s body? Or does he think of it by analogy
with the beginning, middle and ending of an animal's life, i.e. its
generation, middle life, and death? On the former interpretation,
the thought lies close to that of Plato's Phaedrus (264c), where
Socrates says that a speech
ought to be put together like a living creature, with a body 
of its own, not headless or footless, but having middle parts 
and extremities properly in keeping with each other, and with 
the whole.
This morphological comparison might not, at first sight, seem 
entirely apt for Aristotle's purpose. For an animal's 'beginning, 
middle and- end’ are not, if we take them in this way, related in 
a manner,wholly analogous to the phases, of a play's action. The 
parts of an animal are not temporally ordered and so do not exhibit 
the causal connection that links successive phases of dramatic 
action. They do not constitute 'beginning, middle and..end', as 
Aristotle expressly defines them here, in terms of a temporal 
series. And teleute, used (50b26-27, b'29) for the 'ending' of the 
action represented by the play, might seem more closely analogous
1 3
to an animal's death than to an extremity of its body.
More to the point, therefore, might seem a comparison between
the phases of the action and the stages of an animal's life, its
generation, middle life, and death. Analogously, the action
represented by a play must have a birth in time. True, it does not
start ex ni hi 1o and its antecedents must be revealed in the play
if we are to understand it at all. But the beginning must be a
fresh point of departure. Similarly, it has a continuous history,
from conception onwards, like an animal, each phase being linked
with what precedes and follows it, until the ending or 'death' with
which it finishes. Any later consequences of the action, though
they may be prefigured in the play, lie outside the action itself,
like the descendants of an animal. If we are to understand the
zoological model in this 'temporal' sense, then the action of a
tragedy will be 'complete' or 'whole', not as an animal is 'fully
developed’ at maturity, but as it is 'finished' at death.
This interpretation of the model, however, must be wrong. For
in a counterpart passage about epic in ch 23 (59a17-21), we find
the same-comparison used morphologically:
As for the narrative art of mimesis in spoken verse, it is 
evident that its plot-structures should have a dramatic 
coherence, just as in tragedy, and that they should concern 
an action which is unitary and complete (with beginning, 
middle (mesa) and end (telos)), so that, as with a living 
creature, the single and entire structure may yield the 
pleasure which belongs to it.
Here Aristotle uses the plural mesa for 'middle*, clearly meaning
(like Socrates in the Phaedrus ) the middle parts of an animal's
- 13body; and tel os for 'end', i.e.'extremity’, replaces teleute. 
Moreover, the point is made that the epic must, like an animal ,
14
produce its 'proper pleasure’ through being ’one, whole’ (59a20). 
But this must refer to the unity and wholeness of an animal viewed 
at a given time, rather than the unity and wholeness possessed by 
an animal’s entire life-span. For Aristotle evidently intends a 
comparison between the pleasure proper to observation of a 
’complete' animal and the pleasure proper to the appreciation of 
epic. Yet no distinctive pleasure is to be gained from surveying 
an animal’s entire life-span.: whereas there i_s a distinctive
pleasure to be derived from synchronic observation of a unitary, 
whole animal. The source of this pleasure throws much light upon 
the pleasure proper to epic and tragedy, as we shall shortly 
see.
At 50b34-51a6 Aristotle considers the magnitude (megethos) of
the action to be represented:
Moreover, any beautiful object, whether a living creature or 
any other structure of parts, must possess not only ordered 
arrangement but also an appropriate scale (megethos) (for 
beauty is grounded in both size and order). A creature could 
not be beautful if it is either too small - for perception of 
it is practically instantaneous and so cannot be experienced 
JjT- - or too great, for contemplation of it cannot be a single
experience, and it is not possible to derive a sense of unity 
and wholeness from our perception of it (imagine an animal a 
thousand: mil es 1 ong). Just, therefore, as a beautiful body or 
creature must have some size, but one which allows it to be 
perceived all together (eusunopton), so piot structures should 
be of a length which can be easily held in the memory 
(eumnêmoneuton).
Here we need to understand the point of comparing our experience
of the action represented by a tragedy with the viewing of a tiny
14 -
or an enormous animal. We should first notice four occurrences
in 50b38-51a2 of the rich words theôrla and theôreln. They suggest
not just the plain ’seeing’ of an animal^ or merely 'looking at
but the scientific study of 1t. The15it',  i .  study of an 
infinitesimally small animal is said to be ’confused* (sugcheitai), 
because the creature is too tiny for its internal complexity to be 
discerned. Without a microscope, which Aristotle of course lacked, 
one could not scrutinize it to see how its parts were structured,
and how they functioned for the good of the whole. It would
therefore lack any recognizable beauty. We could admire neither the 
individual animal nor its species.
Conversely, an animal one thousand miles 1 ong , though vits
parts could be inspected piece-meal over a long time, could not be
observed as a whole simultaneously from any single viewpoint. An
overview or conspectus of it would be impossible; and by the time
one had examined every part, all sense of its unity and wholeness 
16would be lost. Consequently, one could not understand how its
parts were interrelated, or how they worked to enable it to survive 
and to flourish, in the manner proper to its species.
For Aristotle, however, synoptic viewing of the parts in 
relation to the whole, and of the whole as consisting of
interrelated parts, is essential if we wish to understand a 
creature and admire its species. That is why a fine animal has to 
be of a certain magnitude. Likewise with our appreciation of a 
play. It requires close study of each of its 'parts’, analogous to 
the study of an animal's anatomy. In the former case, when we see 
the end to which something is a means, we admire the cunning of the 
artist. In the latter case we admire the cunning of nature. But in 
both cases, what is fundamental to our appreciation is a grasp of 
the contribution made by each element to a properly integrated.
1 6
functioning whole. This implication of the analogy can be best
understood from Aristotle’s zoological writings, especially the
Parts of Animals, where functional interdependence is illustrated
in detail for a vast number of bodily organs, themselves often
possessing huge internal complexity.
Just as, in the composition of an animal, ’nature makes
nothing in vain', so each element in a wel 1-constructed plot should
be placed where it is for good and sufficient reason. For, as
Aristotle will say in ch 8, when discussing the unity that should
characterize the action represented by a tragedy,
... the plot structure, as the mimesis of action, should be 
a représentâtion of a unitary and complete action; and its 
parts, consisting of the events, should be so constructed that 
the displacement or removal of any one of them will disturb 
and disjoint the work's wholeness. For anything whose presence 
or absence has no cléar effect cannot be counted an integral 
part of the whole (51a31-35).
Any item that is genuinely part of an organic whole must be
essential to it, or it will be a mere accretion. Similarly, every
incident in a plot should ’have a clear effect' (poiei epidelon,
51a35), a discernible bearing upon what happens elsewhere in the
action, and thus, ultimately, upon the entire play. Whatever is
integral to the play’s action must contribute to the whole nexus
of events in which its plot consists. Our. grasp of the whole and
our understanding of the parts are thus, interrelated, each
complementing the other. We must therefore not only study each part
in detail but also gain a conspectus of the whole play.
Just as a perceptible structure is needed for a fine.animal, 
to determine an appropriate size for it, so likewise for the action 
represented by a tragic plot.· Just as the animal must have a size
17
enabling it to be viewed all together as a whole, so the plot must
have such a length as can be readily remembered (51a4~6). By this
Aristotle means, I suggest, not that we must be able to remember
earlier stages of the plot while the later ones are still unfolding
before us in the theatre; but that after we have seen or read the
play, we must be able to recall the action as a whole, so that we
may discern and ponder the structural connections through which the
plot works. We must retain in the memory a conspectus of the plot
17as representing a certain nexus of events. For only if we
recognize its structure as representing that nexus, can we admire 
the whole play for its illumination of the interplay between 
character and thought, motivation and action in real life. That is 
why a synoptic overview of the plot is crucial for our learning 
from the play, and hence for its proper magnitude.
If that interprêtâtion is correct, it has an important bearing 
upon what Aristotle means by the pleasure that is ' proper ’ to 
tragedy (53b11 ) . That pleasure .is, obtained not solely, or even 
primarily, while we are watching the play, but rather in subsequent 
reflection upon it. For if tragedy's proper pleasure depends upon 
seeing the parts in relation to the whole, it will not be available 
to any viewer who has not yet gained a conspectus of the whole. 
That conspectus is not possible for an audience who are still 
watching or hearing the play for the first time, especially for the 
majority who have no prior knowledge of the plot. The pleasure of 
pondering the import of a story in its entirety will not felt by 
first-time viewers or hearers till they have finished it.13 And even 
those who know the story, though they, may recognize the ending as
18
foreshadowed in earlier episodes, will hardly be able to achieve
a conspectus of the play while they are engrossed in the detail of
20any particular incident. The pleasure must come, to an significant
extent, only after watching or reading.
That is why Aristotle, when giving practical guidance as to
a desirable length for the action of a play, can prescind (51a6-7)
from the dictates of competitive performance at drama festivals
(tous agônas) and the limits of an audience's attention (ten
aisthêsin), discounting these as irrelevant to the dramatist’s
craft as such. The dramatist need not be specially exercised about
the length or conditions of performance.' What matters is that the
21action represented can be easily remembered. It should be as large
c
as is consistent with its being ’visible all together’ (sundelos,
51a10-11). The same notion of conspectus reappears later (59b19-
20, cf. eusunoptos at 59a33) in the discussion of epic, where it
is required that the beginning and the end be perceivable at one
22view (sunorasthai). The entire plot of the Odyssey can be 
summarized in a single 43-word sentence (55b17-23). But one cannot 
achieve such an overview unless and until one has finished reading 
or hearing the poem.
We must now notice a crucial feature of the- pleasure gained 
from retrospect upon an entire play. This pleasure is
distinguishable from the responses of pity or fear felt while we
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are in the theatre or whi 1 e the play is being read. It is a
pleasure of the intellect, not a frisson, a harrowing, stirring or
venting of the emotions, even though those experiences may contain
their own kinds of pleasure. It is a çéflective, scientific.
1 9
24philosophical, dispassionate pleasure, since it attends upon our
learning or understanding the 'universels' about human action and
suffering that the work has portrayed.
That this ijs the sort of pleasure that Aristotle has in mind
as ’proper’ to ’poetry’ is evidenced, I believe, by a notorious
25passage in ch 4, to which we should now look back.
At 48b4-19 ’poetic' représentâtion is traced to two natural
and distinctively human instincts: (a) to represent (b5~8); and (b)
to enjoy représentât ions made by others (b8~9). In connection with
(b), Aristotle distinguishes between (i) pleasure due to learning
from certain likenesses qua representations of a familiar original
(b15-17), and (ii) pleasure due to other aspects, such as the
workmanship or colour (b17~19). The former sort of pleasure is said
to come about, because
it happens that, in viewing, they come to understand and infe^ 
what each thing [is], e.g. that this [person is] that one’.
Thus, the enjoyment of looking at the likenesses is bound up with
’understanding’ and ’inferring*; and these take place 'in viewing’.
But how do the viewers ’understand’ or ’infer what each thing is’?
What exactly is understood or inferred from what about what? How
does ’viewing’ enable them to understand? And how are, we to
understand the schematic example, ’that this [person is] that one’?
The demonstrative pronouns (houtos ekeinos), in the received
text Just translated, are masculine. So it is-usually assumed that
Ar i stot 1 e is ta 1 king a bout t he pi easure of r ecogn i z i ng a pi ctu.re
as a likeness of a particular human subject; ’that [portrait] is
27[a likeness of] so-and-so’ . But what do we ’understand’ or ’learn’
/
from this? As Lucas remarks (72, on 48b13), ’when we have 1earnt
20
what already familiar thing a picture represents we have not learnt 
28much'. Moreover, there need not be any conscious ’inference’ in
such recognition. When we can simply see straight off whom a
portrait depicts, there need be no particular feature from which
its subject is consciously inferred, nothing that it would be
29natural to call an ’inference’ (sullogismos) at all. Furthermore,
it is hard, on this interpretation, to see why Aristotle should
associate the relevant pleasure preeminently with philosophers
(48b13), even though he does (somewhat grudgingly) extend the
capacity for learning to others. He gives a prominence to
philosophical pleasure in understanding which would seem out of
place, if he were thinking merely of the delight that anyone may
feel in recognizing the subject of a likeness. What he must have
in mind, surely, is a pleasure which, although universally shared,
is taken especially in the sort of ’viewing’ or ’observing*
(theorein, 48b11, b16) in which philosophers engage more than most
people. What can this pleasure be?
Fortunately, two other passages contain related lines of
thought. The first occurs in the Rhetoric (1371b4~9):
Again, since learning and wondering are pleasant, it follows 
that such things as acts of representation must be pleasant 
- for instance painting, sculpture, poetic composition - and 
every product of skilful representation ; this latter even if 
the object represented is not pleasant: for it is not the 
object itself which here gives delight; but there is an 
inference that this is that (alia sullogismos esti hotl touto 
ekeino), with the result that one learns something (Oxford 
trans, rev. Barnes).
Here we find the same emphasis upon learning or understanding·;- the
same connection of learning with inference, and a similar schematic
example to illustrate the observation /that even where the
21
represented object Is not pleasant, the representation will still
give.pleasure because It results In learning. But there Is one
noteworthy difference between this text and the Poetics one. The
demonstrative pronouns here are neuter,* so that Aristotle need not
be thinking, at least primarily, and perhaps not at all, of human
examples. We shall return to this point shortly.
Our second passage comes from the Parts of Animals (645a7~17):
For even in animals that give no pleasure as regard's sense- 
perception (pros aisthesin), nevertheless in terms of 
scientific study (pros theorian) nature who fashioned them 
provides unbounded pleasure for those who can recognize causes 
(aitiai) and are by nature philosophers. Indeed, it would be 
paradoxical and illogical, if when studying their likenesses 
we enj'oy doing so because we are at the same time studying 
the skill that fashioned those likenesses, such as painting 
and sculpture, yet we do not love still more the study of the 
oriainals constituted by nature, at least when we can discern 
their causes' (trans. Balme).
Here we have a contrast between failure to please the senses and
boundless pleasure given to the intellect through scientific study.
And Aristotle argues that the intellectual pleasure of studying
even inherently unpleasant obj'ects can compensate for their
repugnance to the senses.
Wlnat n-s notable in this text is the extent to which the
pleasure afforded by nature's products comes from recognition of
cauSes, ’for those who can recognize causes and are by nature
philosophers' (645a10), and 'at least when we can discern causes'
(a15). Our marvel at nature's skill depends upon our understanding
the ends for which she makes her products, and the ingenuity with
which their parts are adapted to those ends. The pleasure comes
from grasping the ’final cause', i.e. understanding each part of
the creature in the light of its function, which is the study upon
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which Aristotle is just embarking in these lectures on animal parts 
( 639a14-16, cf. 646a8~646b27 ) .
If his analogical argument is to work here, the same must hold
for our admiration of the skill with which a representation is
crafted. We admire each element in the likeness, when we understand
its final cause, its role in the larger whole to which it belongs.
This requires us to see what item in the original it was designed
to capture, and thus how it contributes to our detailed
understanding of a real living thing. Hence we can learn from the
likeness ’what each thing is’. By noting, for example, that that
is the kidney or the bladder, we can learn what each of those
organs is. In this way we can learn about inherently repulsive
objects from ’those likenesses of them that have been executed with
30very great precision' , which are the ones that Aristotle says we 
enjoy viewing. His mention of 'precision' is particularly 
significant, for it is likenesses fashioned in precise detail that 
can teach us, often better than any real thing, just how the parts 
of an animal, or of each of its organs, are structured and 
interrelated, and thus how they enable the organ or the animal as 
a whole to function. That, indeed, is the purpose of á laboratory 
model or diagram such as Aristotle's lecture-room must have 
contained.^  And the pleasure taken in studying such likenesses 
comes from what the Rhetoric calls 'learning and wondering’, i.e! 
.¿from gratifying our curiosity and from admiring nature's cunning.
An excellent example occurs in the History of Anima 1s (510a30- 
34), where Aristotle is describing the testicles of viviparous 
footed animals, and expia ini ng the complex du c t wo r k that links them
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with the aorta, the kidneys, the bladder and the penis:
all this may be studied by the light of the accompanying 
diagram (tes hupographês têsde) wherein the letter A marks the 
starting point of the ducts that extend from the aorta: the 
letters KK mark the heads of the testicles and the ducts 
descending to them; the ducts extending from these along the 
testicles are marked&A ; the ducts turning back, in which is 
the white fluid, are marked&B ; the penisA ; the bladder E; 
and the testicles (Oxford trans. rev. Barnes).
Students at this lecture are indeed ’coming to understand, and
inferring what each thing is', for they are learning, by studying
'this diagram here’, exactly how the genital apparatus of these
animals is structured. To enjoy learning this from the diagram,
they must already be able to recognize the testicles as such (and
therefore must have seen such organs before). But the diagram
enables them also to figure out how they are connected with other
organs, how the seminal fluid is stored in them, and how the whole
reproductive system works. In this way a visual likeness can enable
the student to move beyond the mere ability to recognize certain
organs (’those are testicles'), to a detailed understanding of what
Job they do and how they do it ('so that is what those things
arel'). This is notably the case when the diagram makes visible an
internal or 'deep' structure that escapes superficial observation,
and can be discovered only by dissection, which has been mentioned
Just above (509b23).
Ifthis is the class-room situation presupposed in our texts,
we may understand the neuter demonstratives' of the Rhetoric passage
as identifying items in a diagram or replica with their
counterparts in a real animal, perhaps a cadaver on the dissecting
table. The words ’this is that' are accompanied by the lecturer's
/
gestures towards an element in the likeness and its counterpart in
the real thing. We understand and infer ’what each thing is V, when 
we grasp-not only, what each item in the figure represents but also 
what the real thing reptesented is for. The understanding and 
inferring are not merely a matter of correctly deducing which real 
item is represented by the likeness, but also of finding out 
something about the real item itself. ’Learning* from . a 
représentâtion depends crucially upon coming to see what Job the 
represented item does and how it does it. Thus the ’understanding 
and inferring’ that are made possible by the representation of even 
inherently disgusting objects are connected with an improved 
understanding of the natural order. Which is precisely the claim 
we have seen Aristotle making for epic and dramatic fiction with 
respect to human life and action.
If çh-fg -¡s correct, it points to a suggestive and fruitful
analogy in Aristotle’s mind between learning from epic or tragedy
and learning from the detailed study of nature. In both there is
a tension between sensory or emotional revulsion and intellectual
fascination; and in both cases the latter compensates abundantly
for the former. Especially notable in this connection is the
32reference at Poetics 48b12 to corpses. These, we remember, are 
strewn all over the Homeric epics; and in tragedy, though deaths 
do not usually occur on the stage, they are often reported in gross 
physical detail. Pain and suffering, more broadly, are endemic in 
both genres; and in one passage (52b1Q-13) Aristotle treats 
suffering (pathos), exemplified by ’visible deaths, torments, 
woundings, and other things of the same kind', as a vital 
ingredient in tragic plot, even though he does not regard all such
suffering as appropriately 'pitiful* for tragedy (53b15-18).
: The visual horrors that he Is thinking of at Rhetoric 13?1b4-
9 and Poetics 48b10-12 do not seem specially likely to be the
corpses that were occasionally represented in ancient paintings or 
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sculptures. They are much more likely to be cadavers Introduced
in his own lecture-room, and used for instruction or research.
These would very natural1 y prompt references during a lecture to
'things which in themselves we see with pain', and would provide
handy analogues for the painful subject-matter of epic and drama.
In viewing both sets of objects, we gain pleasure not from the
grisly realities themselves, but from learning, through their
représentâtions, about the relevant living species.
Plato, we may recall, had viewed the horrors of drama as
pandering to a morbid side of our nature. To illustrate one sort
of psychological conflict, he had mentioned a certain Leontius
(Republic 439e-440a) , who gratified a ghoulish urge to peek at the
corpses of some executed criminals, ashamed though he was of
wanting to feast his eyes on the gruesome sight. The dramatist, in
Plato's view of him, caters for Just such a prurient impulse.·^
Aristotle's remarks about the représentât ion of inherently
painful things, such as base animals and cadavers, can be read as
35a response to this. What we enjoy in poetic fiction is not the 
horrible thing itself, but coming to understand that horror, 
learning about its genesis in human motivation and feeling, from 
the way the author has depicted the doings and sufferings of his 
characters. That is why Aristotle scornfully dismisses as 'quite 
outside the sphere of tragedy' (53b8-1Q) those who strive for
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sensational effects by, spectacul ar or lavish staging... The mere 
relish of atrocity forms no part of the pleasure that is ’proper’ 
to tragedy. If Aristotle lived in our time, he would pass similar 
Judgment upon merchants of pain and cruelty in the film industry. 
But he would also contend that the fictional exploration of human 
suffering in film or theatre need no more be morbid than the 
clinical study of animal pathology need be pathological.
We can now return to the text of Poetics 48b17. If it contains 
the same thought as the parallel passages Just discussed, we shall
3g .
do wel1, with some critics, to read the demonstratives at 48b17
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as neuter, an easy emendation. If we accept this change, what
Aristotle has in mind is not the identification of the subject of
a human likeness (’that is so-and-so’), but the recognition of each
element within a complex diagram or replica as representing a
corresponding part of a living thing (’that is the kidney’); and
the learning through inference of general truths about living
things of the relevant type (’what the kidney is', i.e. what it is
for and how it works). This reading makes the passage prefigure the
sort of dispassionate learning of universals from tragedy and. epic
that we have distilled from later texts.
It also frees Aristotle from a common suspicion of aesthetic
naivete. He says that a représentât ion will not produce pleasure
qua représentât ion, ’if one happens to have no previous familiarity
38with the sight’ (48b17-18). This has suggested to many readers 
that the pleasure basic to aesthetic response lay, for him, merely 
in seeing a picture's resemblance to a familiar original. To that 
view it may, of course, be objected that one may derive greater
pleasure, and a more valuable aesthetic experience, from a,Ver Meer
portrait of some wholly unknown person, than from recognizing a
39snapshot of one’s mother-in-law. But on our account of the
passage, Aristotle does not mean that the pleasure’ produced by a'
likeness derives from seeing its resemblance to a familiar human'
individual; or that we can Judge a portrait aesthetically only in
terms of its likeness to someone we already know. For our interest
in the likeness is not limited to mere recognition of the
particular item represented. Rather, our pleasure comes from
learning general truths about a certain sort of subject from parts
or aspects of that subject upon which the likeness has focused our
attention. We can gain pleasure from studying the likeness for what
40it can teach us, in general, about its counterparts in real life.
It thus has the kind of instructive realism that is to be found in 
epic or drama. For much in these, as in other modes of fiction, 
strikes us as true to our own prior experience of human behaviour; 
and we learn from them with enjoyment because they recover for us 
what was implicit in that experience and enable us to view it with 
a deepened understanding. If some such perspective upon fiction Is 
implicit in Aristotle’s visual example at 48b15-19, then the 
insights of ch 9 regarding its generalizing aim are already 
anticipated in ch 4.
*
Several important aspects of Aristotle’s literary theory have been 
passed over in this paper. Almost nothing has been said of the 
emotional impact of fiction, or its contribution to the development 
of moral sensibility. The whole problem of katharsis, which no
28
overall interpretation of the Poetics can ignore, has been left 
aside. There is no space even to raise the key questions here. But 
perhaps we can 1ea rn somet hi ng from the texts discussed above, 
without becoming entangled in more controversial issues. We have 
found in those texts a significant analogy between learning from 
tragedy or epic and the study of organic nature. In the light of 
that analogy, 'poetry' should be seen not, with Plato, as the arch­
enemy of philosophy but rather as its ally. Tragedy and epic can 
illuminate human life and nature. The understanding to be gained 
from fiction in general is a rich source of intellectual pleasure, 
enough to give the Platonist a run for his money, even if it paid 
no emotional or moral dividends at all.
Aristotle’s approach to poetry, in the aspect we have 
considered, may be broadly dubbed ’ intellectual ist’. By way of 
conclusion, and for the contrast it affords with that approach, it 
may be worth recalling a memorable protest once voiced by 
Wordsworth against the intellectual study of nature:
Sweet is the lore that nature brings;
Our meddling intellect
Mis-shapes the beauteous forms of things:-
We murder to dissect.
Aristotle did not, of course, share Wordsworth’s romantic vision 
of 'nature’s lore'. To his eye, our admiration of the ’beauteous 
forms' of things required the most intense scrutiny of their minute 
structure. This applied no less to the artefacts called epic and 
tragedy than to 1iving things. By taking them apart, our Intellects 
- need not ’mis-shape their,, beauteous forms'. The ’anatomy’ of 
criticism is not murder. On the contrary, works of fiction will
V
come fully to life, will do their Job for us, only if we will study
29
them patiently, analyze their detail, ponder the role of each 
element in the complex whole. It is in that way that a literary 
work can achieve its full impact, produce its ’proper pleasure'.
In that direction we may still seek a sane rationale for 
literary criticism. Along the Aristotelian trail we have followed, 
the paths of the philosopher, the scientist, the fiction-writer, 
and the critic will all ultimately converge in the human quest for 
self-understanding. And it may well be in some such way that the 
'old quarrel between philosophy and poet-craft’ of which Plato once 
spoke should be finally laid to rest.
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NOTES
An early version of this paper, entitled 'Organic Models in the 
Poetics 1 , was presented to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy 
at Baltimore on January 7, 1989. I am grateful to the audience for
discussion of a pre~circulated draft, and also to participants in 
philosophy seminars at the University of Western Ontario and 
Carleton University, where subsequent versions were read.
All references to the Poet 1 cs are to the Oxford Text of Kassel, 
with the initial '14' omitted from Bekker page numbers. The 
translation used for quotations, unless otherwise noted, is from 
the edition by S. Halliwell (1987). The early versions of this 
paper were written before I had an opportunity to study that 
edition or the same author’s masterly study of the Poetics (1986). 
I hope that the present version, though differing from Halliwell 
at certain points, may serve generally to reinforce his views on 
the relation between fiction, piot-structure, and 'universels1 in 
Aristotle, especially as expounded on pp 72-73, 98-101, and 10 5- 
110 óf his 1987 commentary.
Besides Phaedrus 264c-d (to be noticed below), most notably in the 
Timaeus, where the physical world is a cosmic animal , and the 
Republic, where the polls is continually represented as if it were 
the painting or statue of a living thing. See my 'Image and Reality 
in Plato’s Republic ' passim.
/
The connection is especially well marked at Phaedrus 275d, where
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’the offspring of zographia' are said to ’stand like zonta’, but 
to remain mute If asked a question. They capture the static 
appearance, but not the powers of speech and movement possessed by 
live human subjects.
5. Anatomy of Criticism, 14. Biological Influence upon Aristotle’s
distinctions among literary genres will not concern us further 
here, but It Is evident In his sketch of their history. Tragedy, 
he thinks, evolved from earlier poetic forms Into Its present 
’full-grown’ state: after 'many changes’, It stopped developing
’once It had attained Its own nature’ (49a15), having acquired 
’parts' not found In Its predecessors, even In epic (49b16-20).
6. See, especially, the clinching point of Aristotle’s argument In ch
9 (51b27-29): 'It Is clear, then, from what has been said that the
poet should be a maker of plot-structures rather than of verses. 
In so far as his status as a poet depends on mimesis, and the 
object of his mimesis Is actions'.
7. Following Halllwell, I use 'lyric poetry’ to render melopolia
(50a10, b16) This may remind us that the scope of Aristotle’s main 
discussion In the Poet 1 cs Is narrower as well as wider than 
’poetry’ In our sense. Aristotle's almost total neglect of the 
tragic chorus Is connected with his view of poiêsis as fiction. 
There Is no general theory of poetry In the extant Poetics. As 
Halllwell says (1987, 110), ’... It is the fictional framework of
a poem, not its verbal texture, which marks its poetic nature'. See
also his discussions of Aristotle’s neglect of the chorus (1986, 
ch 8, esp 249-50; 1987, 152-154).
See Lucas’s notes on 51b2, 51b8, 59a25.
For a concise appraisal, see Hubbard, 102, n 1.
My Roman history tutor at Oxford, the incomparable C.E. Stevens, 
used to say that if his own ingenious version of certain episodes 
in Cicero’s political career were accepted, it ’made the history 
much more piquant’. So indeed it did; but we should bear in mind 
that ’history’ in English contains an ambiguity (not shared by 
’poetry’) between historical facts and an historian’s account of 
them. ’Piquancy', even when it is apt as a characterization of the 
former, is a dubious virtue in the latter. Historical facts may be 
piquant, or they may be dull as ditch-water, but either way the 
historian’s first duty is to ascertain and report them. Dullness 
is obviously a defect in a play or novel, but in a history need not 
be a fault of the. same magnitude. Good historical narrative, as we 
tend to think of it, has to be selective, and no less unified, 
organized, and focused than good fiction. It is also, preferably, 
no less readable; and the imaginative flair needed to 'make the 
past live* may be as important as the sober virtues befitting a 
Judicious scholar. But when writers such as Thucydides (whom 
Aristotle curiously nowhere mentions by name) impart to their 
narrative the character of an epic or a tragedy, one may argue that 
their works embody literary values which are external to their
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basic task, and which will even be inimical to that task, if they 
should lead the historian to project a fanciful pattern on to 
events. Aristotle does not, however, defend his contrast between 
poetry and history in any such way. His low view of history, 
particularly of the 'histories’ disparaged at 5Sa21-29, may perhaps 
be conditioned by that usage of historia in which it meant mere!y 
a collection of ’raw data' from which generalizations have not yet 
been distilled. 'Histories’ on that level will be limited to the 
recording of particular facts, since the general laws through which 
the facts might be explained or interpreted remain as yet 
unformulated.
11. Hubbard, Halliwell and Janko take epitithemene (51b10) as
concessive. Lucas (121, on 51b10) plausibly argues for a temporal 
interpretation, on the basis of the directions for plot 
construction in ch 17. See, especially, 55b12: ' after this [sc.
after mapping out the plot in broad outline], the poet should now 
supply the names and introduce episodes'.
12. Space limits preclude adequate discussion of the relationship 
between the 'qualitative* (ch 6) and ’quantitative' (ch 12) parts 
of tragedy. But the distinction is, I suspect, zoologically based, 
the 'qualitative* parts being thought of., as corresponding to the 
constituent materials of an animal, and the 'quantitative* to its 
organs. moría is used at 47a11 for both quantitative and 
qualitative parts of poetry, and seems interchangeable with mere, 
also used of both types of 'part' (50a8, 52b14, b25). In the
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zoological works, as Peck has noted (Loeb ed. Pa rts of An 1 mals, 
28), morion (unlike the English ’parts') covers 'uniform' stuffs 
(blood, bone, etc) as well as the 'non-uniform' organs made of 
them. Aristotle could, then, have thought of the 'quantitative' 
parts of tragedy (prologos, epelsodlon, etc) as blended together 
from the 'qualitative' ones In different proportions, just as an 
animal's organs are variously composed of blood, bone, etc. 
Strictly, this conception of 'qualitative parts' would not suit the 
'part' called muthos, to be discussed below. For muthos, as 'the 
soul' of tragedy. Is not comparable with any material stuff 
composing a living thing, but only with Its ’form’. But the analogy 
between plot-structure and ’soul1 may not yet have suggested Itself 
to Aristotle when he distinguished broadly between ’qualitative' 
and ’quantitative’ parts.
13. teleutê, though commonly meaning ’death’. Is used for the tail-end 
of a creature at PA 685a1 (cf. GA, 720b18), and for the end of a 
bone at £A 654b24. At Metaphys. 1Q21b28 Aristotle notes that 
teleute ('death’) Is called telos ('fulfilment') In a secondary 
sense, because both are extremes (eschatra). Here, though teleute 
means ’death', It shares with telos a connection with the Idea of 
’extremity'.
14. The text at 50b39 Is uncertain, and there Is reason to suspect tou 
analsthêtou chronou. If this Is taken to mean 'time that Is 
Imperceptible', or ’an Imperceptible Instant of time’ (Janko), or 
even 'for perception of it is practically instantaneous’
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(Halliwell). Aristotle says elsewhere (De Sensu 448b18, b24-25)
that there could be no Imperceptible period of time: and one may 
doubt the explanation of Lucas (113, on 50b38), that Aristotle 
believed in a connection between the size of an object and the 
length of time needed to look at it. Seeing an object is, in 
Aristotelian terms, an ’activity’ (energeia), the exercise of a 
capacity that is as fully realized at any one moment of its use as 
at any other. In those terms it takes no time at all to see an 
object, hence no more time to look at an elephant than at a flea. 
There is much to be said for deleting chronou with Bonitz, or 
perhaps for emending the text more radically, to read sugcheitai 
gar hê theôria tou eggus anaisthêtou: ’for the observation of what
is nearly imperceptible is confused'. The difficulty with chronou 
is somewhat lessened, however, if theôria is taken, as I suggest 
below, to mean ’study’. And the textual uncertainty casts no doubt 
upon the reason why the viewing of a minute creature is said to be 
’confused'. As Lucas (1oc cit) says, 'once an object is too small 
for its parts to be distinguishable, so that their relations cannot 
be seen, it cannot be beautiful'.
15. Halliwell’s version, quoted above, seems to me not to capture the 
force of either theôria or sugcheitai at 50b38, or of theôrousi 
and ek tes theories at 51a1-2. The sense required in b38 is that 
what is barely perceptible is too confused to be studied ; and in 
51a1-2 that unity and wholeness are lost on the observers as, a,
result of their studying, 1 . e. they can't see the wood for the
/
trees. My argument below turns partly upon understanding theôrein
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and theoria as 'studying', but I sometimes speak of 'viewing' or 
'observing', in order to avoid prejudging interpretation in 
translation. See also n 16.
16. Hal li well ('it is not possible to derive a sense of unity and 
wholeness from our perception of it') misses the suggestion that 
the viewing process itself actually destroys awareness of unity 
and wholeness. Janko and others (’its unity and wholeness vanish 
from the observer's view’) make ek tes theories redundant. Else 
('so its unity and wholeness are lost') omits the phrase 
altogether, as does Bywater (’the unity and wholeness of it is lost 
to the beholder'). Hubbard (101) comes closer to the sense needed: 
'since our view of it is not simultaneous, so that we lose the 
sense of its unity and wholeness as we look it over'; but ek may, 
I think, have 'causal' rather than (or alongside) 'temporal' force.
17. At De Mem. 449b15~30 Aristotle argues that memory has the past for
its object: 'No one would say he was remembering what was present,
when it was present*, cf. 451a29-30: 'For a person remembers now 
what he saw or experienced earlier. He does not now remember what 
he experiences now*. It follows that we could not be said to 
’remember* the plot as a whole while still watching or hearing the 
play. Aristotle notes at De Mem. 452a2-4 that 'whatever has some 
order, as things in mathematics do, is easily remembered 
(eumnemoneuta)*, because of the easy mental passage between
successive items. If the same point were applied to a well-ordered
/
dramatic plot, the causal links between its events would help us
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to remember the play as a whole. Thus, eumnêmoneuton at Poet 1cs 
51s5-6 would refer to our retrospect upon an entire play, rather 
than to our experience of it while it was still in progress.
18. At 51bl9-26 Aristotle notes that a 1 though most tragedies of his
time were based upon traditional legend, the few that were not so 
based could please an audience Just as much; and that even the 
traditional stories were familiar only to few of the audience, yet 
could still please everyone. Lucas (123, on 51b26) has questioned 
whether the traditional stories were, in fact, ’known only to a 
minority'. But whether or not Aristotle’s premiss is true, the 
direction of his argument is remarkable: a play could give
pleasure, he urges, not in spite of prior knowledge of the story, 
but in spite of prior ignorance of it. He is not concerned, as a 
modern critic might be, about prior knowledge 'spoiling it’ for the 
audience or 'giving it away'. His appeal to invented plots (which 
were common in comedy, 51b12-15), effectively reinforces his 
contrast between poiesis and history, which stands out more clearly 
in pure fiction than in plots based upon legend. For in the latter, 
especially if legend is not differentiated from historical fact, 
the fiction writer's aim becomes more readily confused with the 
historian's. This confusion still bedevils historically based 
fiction in our own time, as the current furore over Salman 
Rushdie's novel well illustrates.
19. Aristotle's prescriptions for plot-construction, especially his 
emphasis upon surprise (chs 9, 11) and denouement (ch 18), seem to 
cater for an audience ignorant of the story; although even in
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Oedi pus Rex, which he so greatly admired, these elements are 
arguably less crucial than in a modern whodunnit (contra A.E. 
Taylor 111). Agatha Christie's The Mouse-Trap is said to have been 
ruined for the passenger of a London cab-driver who shouted, as his 
client walked into the theatre, 'The detective did it I', in revenge 
for an ungenerous tip. Was Oedi pus Rex ever ruined for an audience 
by telling them that? If so, much irony in the play would have been 
sadly lost upon them. But whether the story of a play is known in 
advance or not, the unified structure upon which Aristotle insists 
can be properly appreciated only in retrospect.
20. Aristotle would not, indeed, deny that a play can, and indeed 
should, be enjoyed during performance. Elsewhere (NE. 1175b12) he 
notes that it is when we are not greatly enjoying something that 
we are most readily diverted, remarking that people eat sweets in 
the theatre when the performance is poor. By implication, they 
enjoy the play most while thoroughly absorbed in it. Since he 
argues, in the context of that example, that the pleasure proper 
to an activity is inseparable from, and enhances, our engagement 
in it, there must, presumably, be pleasure concurrent with the 
watching or hearing of a good tragedy well performed. But in chs 
13-14·, when he discusses plot-structures that will elicit pity and 
fear, and thereby afford the pleasure 'proper’ to tragedy (as 
distinct from other sorts of pleasure, which need not, or should 
not, be aimed at, 53b10~11), his preferred structures include the 
entire dramatic action from start to finish (esp. 52b34-53a2, cf. 
51a9~15). And by way of charging certain dramatists with pandering
39
to audience weakness (53a33~36), he criticizes their endings for 
giving a pleasure proper to comedy rather than tragedy. This 
implies, I think, that the pleasure 'proper' to plays in both 
genres depends crucially upon our response to their final outcome. 
What happens to the central figure 'in the end' is vital for the 
total impact of the play. Hence the pleasure taken in an overview 
of the plot, through appreciating its unity and wholeness, must 
await a retrospect upon the completed action.
21. For a sequence of actions performed or represented over time, it 
is arguable that no conspectus will be possible in a single moment. 
Even a quick retrospect in memory will take some length of time, 
unless a diachronic series can somehow be synchronical1 y reviewed. 
But this truism does not invalidate Aristotle's demand for 
conspectus, or annul the distinction between a plot that can be 
readily remembered and one that cannot.
22. A speaker at Baltimore helpfully drew attention to Rhetor ic
1409a24-b8, which has a similar analogy between visual conspectus 
and retention in the memory. Aristotle there contrasts two kinds 
of prose style: 'strung together' (lexis eiromenl) and 'periodic'.
The latter is easier to follow, (1) because listeners can 
anticipate the end of each period while it is still being uttered 
(like runners who can keep going as long as they see the goal ahead 
of them); and (2) because each period, once its sense is complete, 
'has' reached some definite conclusion', and is easily remembered. 
A period has 'a size that can be seen as a whole’’ (megethos
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eusunopton, bl). It will stay In the memory (eumnêmoneutos,b5~6) 
because it has a self-contained structure, with a beginning and an 
end, and the listener thinks that 'something has been made definite 
for him’. The same will apply mutât is mutandis to the comprehension 
of a tragic plot. It requires anticipation of the ending while one 
is following any given episode, but also a memory of each episode 
after one has followed it, and thus a coherent memory of the entire 
action after the play has been seen or heard. For retention in the 
memory, see also n 17 above.
23. This point is bound up with a reading of 53b12-13 which cannot be 
fully elaborated here. I take it from the reference to 'shuddering 
and pitying’ at 53b5 that Aristotle does indeed require the 
tragedian to elicit fear and pity in the audience; but it seems to 
me consistent with that to take ’the pleasure which derives from 
pity and fear by means of mimesis’ (53b12) to attend their 
retrospect upon the whol e play. See nn 20 and 24. A similar 
retrospect upon epic will be suggested by the comparison of its 
'proper pleasure' with that derived from the unity and wholeness 
of an animal (59a20-2 1 ) .-.
24. This is by no means to say that the pleasure is ’unfeeling’ or 
’insensitive’, or to underrate (let alone to deny) the importance 
of tragedy's affective impact. On the contrary, the more deeply we 
have been moved by a play, the more we shall be disposed to reflect 
upon and learn from it. Our cognitive faculties are engaged through
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our feelings ('through pity and fear'). That point, I suspect (but 
cannot here argue), is the key to interpreting the text about 
katharsis (49b27~28).
25. In what follows regarding ch 4, it will be seen that, with
Halliwell (1986, 79), I favour ’adjusting our interpretation of
it, and particularly of the status of its illustration from visual 
mimesis, in the light of what is to be learnt about poetic mimesis 
later in the treatise'. Although my way of doing this diverges from 
his (see n 38 below), I share his concern to bridge the apparent 
gap between ch 4 and later pronouncements, and to dispel any 
impression that Aristotle’s thought in ch 4 lacks its usual 
subtlety.
26. sumbainei theorountas manthanein kai sullogizesthai ti hekaston, 
hoion hoti houtos ekeinos (48b16~17). I have translated as 
literally as possible, manthanein, given here as 'coming to 
understand’, can also mean 'realize' or 'learn', cf. Hubbard, 86.
27. This is the implication of Halliwell’s translation, as of eight out
of the ten other English versions or commentaries I have consulted. 
The exceptions are Else and Nussbaum, both of whom emend the text 
at 48b17 (see nn 28 and 36 below). For Halliwell’s view, see his 
1986 book, 72 with n 36, 77 with n 42, 124, 129-130.
28. On this point, cf. also Else (1957) 132, as well as (1967) 85, n
/
33. But his own interprétât ion, ’This individual is a So-and-so',
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is poorly served by emending houtos ekeinos, as he proposes, to 
houtos ekeino: it would need toioutos ekeinos, as noted by Levens, 
190. For further difficulties with houtos ekeinos see also nn 37 
and 38 below.
Occasionally, to be sure, inference is needed to identify a 
portrait, though less often when the subject is already familiar 
than when it is not. At Topics 140a21 Aristotle mentions the works 
of early painters which could not be identified unless there was 
an inscription on them. In such cases, presumably, a viewer might 
try to infer the subject's identity from features in the picture 
that the original was independently known to have possessed or from 
other evidence not connected with pictorial content. There may 
indeed be great pleasure in solving such puzzles, and much to be 
'learnt' beyond the subject's bare identity. But why should 
Aristotle have chosen such relatively unusual cases to typify our 
responses to likenesses (or to 'works of art') in general? And why 
should he suppose that such inferences will give pleasure only if 
the subject has been previously seen? May we not enjoy figuring out 
that a portrait depicts Socrates (say), even without having 
previously seen him? The subjects of 'early painters' had 
presumably long been dead by Aristotle's time, so at least in their 
case the contention of 48b17-19 would be implausible. See also n 
39 below.
My translation of toutôn tas eikonas tas malista êkribômenas
(Poet les 4 8 b11 ) . The phrase refers not to all likenesses of
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repulsive objects, but to a subset of them, viz. those that have 
been executed with very great precision. This nuance is easily 
missed in translation, and some versions are badly misleading: 
Janko, 'the most proficient images of things'; Bywater, 'the most 
realistic représentâtions of them in art*. It is important to ask 
whether tas eikonas at b15 should be taken to mean 'likenesses' 1n 
general, as by e.g. Halliwell, Janko, and Nussbaum (383), or to 
mean 'these likenesses', i.e. the likenesses of repulsive objects 
mentioned at b11 (as by Hubbard, Potts, and Else). With the latter 
translation, the visual example at b17 should be an instance of 
those horrors, in which case it can hardly be an ordinary human 
portrait, and the grounds for suspecting houtos ekeinos (as usually 
interpreted) will be strengthened. Else legitimately renders 
malista êkribômenas 'when executed in very great detail’, but he 
prefaces this with a gratuitous 'even*. There is no basis for this 
in the Greek; and the implication that we enjoy the likenesses of 
horrible objects in_ spite of rather than because of their detail 
is unwarranted. Janko (xv) most curiously offers Aristotle a 
defence against the objection that, on his theory, a sketch of a 
cow (recognized from its four legs, horns etc) 'involves a loss of 
detail', when detail is precisely what Aristotle himself stresses! 
On the interpretation proposed here, the detail in the likenesses 
is Just what makes them enjoyable objects of study.
31. For Aristotle's lecture-room and its equipment, see the
entertaining article by Jackson.
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32. The implicit relevance of this example to tragedy is rightly 
observed by Halliwell (1986, 64, n 23).
33. Thus Lucas 72, on 48b12. 'The lowest animals' would consort 
somewhat oddly with such corpses (as Lucas seems to realize), 
whereas they could quite naturally be paired with cadavers.
34. Leontius' voyeurism is not fully explained. As Annas notes (129),
it may have had a sexual basis, in view of his penchant for 
cadaverous youths, evidenced in a fragment from contemporary comedy 
(cf. Adam, I 255, on 439e). But his story also reminds us of 'mixed 
pleasures’ in the Phi 1ebus (47d-50e), for it exemplifies the
pleasure felt in suffering. Although this particular 'mixed
pleasure' is explicitly discussed only in connection with comedy 
(43a-50a), Plato mentions it as typical of a wider class of mixed 
feelings aroused in drama as well as in real life (SOb-d). The 
indictments of mimetic poetry at Republic 603b-d and 6Q5d1-7 are, 
I think, broad enough to cover many such paradoxical alloys of 
pleasure with pain.
35. These remarks once prompted Dorothy Sayers (222-223), tongue-in-
cheek, to attribute to Aristotle 'a stout appetite for the gruesome 
...The crawling horror of The Speckled Band would, we infer, have 
pleased him no less than The Corpse in the Car, The Corpse in Cold
Storage or The Body in the Silo.' Of course we need infer nothing
of the sort, any more than we need attribute macabre tastes to a 
pathologist merely because he is keen on his Job.
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36. Nussbaum (388) has recently adopted this emendation, also citing 
Rhetoric 1371b5,ff. But she reminds us, lest the passsage should 
sound ’too flat to support any sophisticated account of tragic 
pleasure’, that ’Aristotle is here speaking very generally of human 
delight, at all ages, in works of art of many types’. To my ear the 
words sound by no means 'too flat' to support the. required 
extension to pleasure in learning from poetic representation. 
Although their intended application is indeed general (and they 
lend themselves to further ’sophistication’)., they were prompted 
not by 'works of art’, but by the specific sort of learning that 
is achieved with visual aids in a classroom. This would explain the 
prominence of ’philosophers’, downplayed by Lucas (73, on 48b17), 
but properly stressed by Halliwell (1986, 78). The connection with 
zoological diagrams or replicas and cadavers was seen by Else 
(1957, 128) and by Janko (74, on 48b10), but neither identifies the 
specific learning about ’final causes' and organic functioning that 
can be heard in the text, if touto ekeino is read at 48b17.
37. 8y reading touto ekeino we avoid the switch to masculine 
demonstratives, which is strange after ti hekaston (48b16-17), as 
Lucas notes ad 1oc. For touto ekeino, cf. also Rhetoric 1410b18. 
If we retain houtos ekeinos, understanding the subject of the 
likeness as human, the pronouns cannot refer to an anatomical 
diagram. If Aristotle (or his listener) wrote houtos ekeinos, he 
may have had in mind the identification of each figure within a 
composite picture containing several human subjects recognizable
46
by members of his audience. (Jackson suggested that two such 
pictures In Aristotle's lecture-room depicted well-known scenes 
from Plato's Protagoras and Phaedo). Or the portrait might have 
depicted an Individual present at the lecture, who could be 
Indicated as 'that person ' (ekeinos), such as Coriscus (Dje Mem. 
450b31, cf. Des Insomn. 461b25). But whatever likenesses Aristotle 
Is thinking of, 'understanding' and 'Inferring' are harder to 
Interpret If the demonstratives are masculine; and scarcely less 
so (pace Else 1957, 132; 1967, 85, n 33) whether the likeness Is
recognized as being one of a familiar species ('that Is a squid, 
an antelope or whatever') or of a familiar Individual ('that Is 
Coriscus’). For either way It remains obscure just what Is 
'understood’ or 'Inferred', how the understanding or Inferring Is 
supposed to take place, and whs/ no pleasure Is produced for a 
viewer who has not seen the Item before. If anatomical learning Is 
not the key to the passage, Aristotle might be thinking of our 
ability to ’understand and Infer’, from the representation of an 
Individual, something about the type to which that subj'ect belongs, 
through the highlighting of significant features of the type that 
we had not noticed beforé. That Interpretation would be more 
plausible If we emended houtos ekeinos to tofoutos ekelnos, a 
fairly small textual change. In that way, as In mine, the text 
could be seen to prefigure the claim of ch 9, that poetry alms at 
’universals’. But the link with Aristotle’s repeated emphasis In 
Poetics upon causal nexus is far stronger If we read touto 
ekeino, and take the demonstratives as advocated above.
8 * Hal 11 well (1886, 
Rhet* 1371b4 ff,
4 7
78, n 45) considers this assertion, together with 
to refute Else's belief that Aristotle Is thinkina
of scientific models and diagrams: hence he thinks Else mistaken
1n see1n g a n y reference to u n1vers a 1 s 1 n t he v1 s u a 1 exam p1e. Bu t 
t hi e a s s e r 11 ο n a t 4 8 b 17—18 Is s u r e 1 y p u z z 11 n g on a n y v 1 sw. It s e e rn s 
hardly more plausible to claim for a portrait that it will produce 
no pleasure qua representation for one who has not previously seen 
Its subject, than to claim this for a replica or diagram.. And 
Halliwell himself (1986, 77, n 42) finds difficulty In applying the 
visual example to poetry if it contains no Implicit reference to 
universale. It is not, Indeed, clear exactly what Aristotle is 
supposing at 48b17 not to have been 'previously seen', since no 
grammatical object of 'seen' (proeorakos) is expressed. But could 
he really have meant, or even believed, that a likeness can give 
pleasure qua representation only if one has previously seen the 
real pa r11 eu 1 a r subject represented? An enjoyable picture may have 
no real subject: and even when it has one, why must one have seen 
that very subject In order for the picture to produce pleasure qua 
representation? That might be so If the pleasure in question 
depended upon the viewer T s ^ abi 1 i ty to compare the likeness with the 
original; but no such ability is here stressed (as it is at Phaedo 
73c-~74e). It would be slightly more plausible to claim that one 
must have previously seen an item of the relevant type: to enjoy 
a picture of a horse qua representation, one need not have seen 
Dobbin, but must at least have seen a horse before, to be able to 
recognize the likeness of one. But even that much might well be 
disputed, so It will seem advisable to refine the claim still
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further, by saying, e.g., that the picture must portray 'an 
identifiable (though not necessari1v a real) figure’ (Halliwell, 
1988 , 73, ital. added), or by speaking of 'the représentât ion of
a possi ble reality which it embodies’ (ibid 74, ital. added). Yet 
how exactly, with such refinements, are we to understand 
proeôrakos? In what sense must we have 'previously seen' a centaur 
or a cyclops, in order to enjoy a picture of one? By connecting the 
passage with scientific models and diagrams, and interpreting it 
as I have proposed, we avoid such problems, but we can still relate 
it to the doctrine about universels in ch 9.
39. Lucas (72, on 48b13) says that the mere recognition of a
resemblance to the subject 'has no relevance to the aesthetic 
enjoyment of a picture'. Compare Collingwood (44): 'The sitters
[for portraits by Raphael, Titian et al.] are dead and gone, and 
we cannot check the likeness for ourselves. If, therefore, the only 
kind of merit a portrait could have were its likeness to the 
sitter, we could not possibly distinguish, except where the sitter 
is still alive and unchanged, between a good portrait and a bad’. 
Collingwood goes on to ''recall a wealthy art-collector, who 
refrained from buying portraits on the ground that there was no way 
of telling a good portrait from a bad when once the sitter was 
dead. 'He was', Collingwoood adds, 'a very good stockbroker'. See 
also n 29 above.
40. A parallel point about the learning of ’universals’ could be 
derived from Aristotle's first explanation for poetry at the start 
of ch 4 (48b5-8), i.e. the distinctive human tendency to represent.
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When he says that the earliest lessons are learnt through mimesis, 
(4 8 b7-8), he may be thinking (possibly inter alia, of. Halliwell 
1 986, 70 with n 34) of children learning to draw. At Politics
1338b1 he says that this should be taught, not for its commercial 
utility, ’but perhaps rather because it makes them observers of 
bodily beauty’. Similarly, at 1338a1-5, drawing is said to make 
them better judges of the products of craftsmen. We may remain 
totally blind to certain visual properties of an object, despite 
seeing countless instances of it, until we try to draw it. And by 
drawing a particular, we may learn something about the class to 
which it belongs.
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